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Abstract: As open public data initiatives have become prevalent among local and 
national governments across the globe with promises of benefits such as increased 
accountability, challenges, especially the governments’ lack of willingness to open 
public data, have also begun to emerge. Existing governance research on open public 
data primarily focuses on how open public data can increase the accountability of 
public bodies. The important steps in achieving accountability are, however, ignored. 
In this paper, we view the perceived risk of liability as a barrier for the public bodies 
to disclose their data in the first place, and hence to achieve accountability as a desired 
outcome. We explore the link between perceived risk of liability and accountability by 
looking into the recently announced Interim Measures for the Opening of Public Data in 
Shanghai as an example of a local regulatory initiative of open public data. Our findings 
show that by identifying the specific data entities and outlining their corresponding 
duties, the interim measures clarify the roles of different public bodies and under what 
conditions they can incur liability. By introducing an exemption clause, they also 
provide public bodies with legal flexibility to cope with uncertain consequences of data 
utilization. In this way, we argue that the interim measures, outlining duties for specific 
entities in data opening in accounting for the consequences of data utilization while 
remaining flexible due to their temporality, constitute a novel regulatory approach 
towards reducing the legal uncertainty around perceived risks of liability in the area of 
open public data, hence potentially contributing to increased accountability. 
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Introduction 
In 2019, the standing committee of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government 
passed Interim Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai, which constitute the 
first local government rules on open public data in China (Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government 2019a; 2019b). It is hardly surprising that Shanghai, as one of the very 
first Chinese local governments that have embarked on the open public data movement, 
is the birthplace of such regulation. The interim measures were celebrated by various 
major Chinese media outlets (e.g., Jiefang Daily 2019; Southern Metropolis Daily 
2019) for their pioneering role in legislating open public data in China, among which 
one of the interviews with the legislators of the interim measures, titled “Shanghai 
legislates public data opening, introducing an “exemption clause” to unburden 
government departments” (Southern Metropolis Daily 2019), has caught our attention. 
In the interview, one of the legislators, Qiu Wei, from the Shanghai Municipal 
Commission of Economy and Informatization, highlighted that one of the aims of 
the interim measures is to encourage the local authorities’ willingness to make their 
data available by identifying the specific data entities, outlining their corresponding 
duties, and the conditions under which local public data entities can incur and be 
exempted from liability. The interim and detailed nature of the legislation constitutes 
a novel approach towards regulating open public data initiatives, which contrasts with 
approaches emphasizing on hard law and lack of concreteness (e.g., the European 
Union’s Directive 2019/1024 on open data and the reuse of public-sector information). 
Furthermore, the measures were introduced by the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government as a local regulatory initiative, in contrast to the majority of existing 
regulations on a supra-national and national level. 
Inspired by this recent development, the purpose of this paper is to provide insights into 
the regulatory approach undertaken by the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 
which aims at increasing public accountability by providing more clarity around 
potential liability issues that may rise for public bodies as a result of disclosing their 
data. In particular, we are interested in understanding how liability and accountability 
are linked in the context of open public data and how regulators can address them. 
Hence, we pose the following research question: How can interim regulatory measures 
reduce the perceived risk of liability among public bodies and contribute to public 
accountability in open public data initiatives?
To this end, we chose to study both the content of the Interim Measures for the Opening 
of Public Data in Shanghai and their interpretations as revealed by their authors. We 
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argue that the interim measures, outlining specific rules, constitute a novel regulatory 
approach towards reducing the legal uncertainty around public bodies’ liability, which 
is one of the barriers preventing public bodies from participating in a meaningful way 
in open public data initiatives, and hence from achieving increased accountability as a 
desired outcome. 
Before we present the details of the development of open public data in Shanghai and 
the emergence of the interim measures, we first position our study in relation to the 
existing knowledge on open public data in relation to governance, law and the relations 
between public accountability and liability. We then introduce our research design and 
present our findings. In the Discussion section, we outline the contributions of this 
study in relation to the existing research gaps.
Open Public Data, Public Accountability and Liability 
In the past decade, open public data, defined as, “non-privacy-restricted and non-
confidential data which is produced with public money and is made available without 
any restrictions on its usage or distribution” (Janssen et al. 2012: 258), have become 
widespread across the globe. An increasing number of local and national governments 
are making various datasets publicly available for public scrutiny and re-use (OECD 
2020). Practitioners and governance researchers argue that open public data can bring 
several benefits, such as increased transparency, civil participation and innovation, and 
accountability (Lourenço et al. 2017; Peixoto 2013; Reggi and Dawes 2016; OECD 
2020). Some researchers, however, have also pointed out that the availability of open 
public data does not necessarily lead to the achievement of all intended benefits 
(Cerrillo-i-Martınez 2012; Lourenço et al. 2017; Peixoto 2013, Reggi and Dawes 
2016). For example, while the provision of open public data may increase transparency, 
it does not necessarily translate into increased accountability (Lourenço et al. 2017; 
Peixoto 2013; Reggi and Dawes 2016). In particular, several researchers have pointed 
out that while public bodies disclose data to the public, they have the discretion to 
select which datasets to make available and, as a result, often the open public data 
cannot be used to hold the disclosing public bodies accountable (Peixoto 2013; Reggi 
and Dawes 2016). 
Public accountability is a desired, but not guaranteed, outcome linked to data 
being made available (Peixoto 2013; Reggi and Dawes 2016). In particular, public 
accountability is achieved through a process involving several steps, such as disclosure 
of data, discussion around the available data, followed by the realization of certain 
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consequences (Bovens 2007; Lourenço et al. 2017; Schillemans, Van Twist and 
Vanhommerig 2013). Thus, for example, after data has been disclosed, relevant 
members of the public can review it and decide a course of action to ensure public 
accountability, which includes identifying issues, responsible parties and outlining 
consequences (Bovens 2007; Lourenço et al. 2017). These consequences can be both 
non-legal (e.g., negative publicity, submitting petitions; see Lourenço et al. 2017), 
which emphasize the social aspect of accountability, or legal (e.g., public bodies can 
be held liable, in some cases, where the data they provide are inaccurate, misused, or 
not updated; see Dulong de Rosnay and Janssen 2014). As public bodies can be held 
accountable, facing both legal and non-legal consequences, they may restrain from 
providing meaningful datasets and instead grant access to datasets “irrelevant for the 
purposes of accountability” (Reggi and Dawes 2016: 75). By doing so, public bodies try 
to manage the risk of being held socially accountable, but even more so legally liable. 
Thus, to mitigate the risks, public authorities may limit their participation in open 
public data initiatives, thus diminishing the overall benefits, which such initiatives can 
bring (Zuiderwijk and Janssen 2014). 
Current research on open public data, however, seems to equate accountability solely 
with transparency, thus ignoring discussion and consequences as important steps 
in achieving public accountability (Lourenço et al. 2017; Peixoto 2013; Reggi and 
Dawes 2016). In this paper, we argue that it is important to understand better the link 
between public accountability as a desired outcome of open public data initiatives and 
the perceived risk of liability by public bodies as a barrier to fully participate in such 
initiatives. 
Researchers have pointed out that the perceived risk stems from the lack of sufficiently 
clear legal rules, which outline under what conditions public bodies will be held liable 
when opening their data to the public (Dulong de Rosnay and Janssen 2014). Instead, 
there are various regulatory approaches, which not only are characterized by a lack of 
specific rules, but also are not harmonized, thus increasing the legal uncertainty. For 
example, under the newly amended European Union Directive 2019/1024 on open 
data and the reuse of public-sector information, public bodies are allowed to use licenses, 
which can contain liability waivers when offering their data for re-use by third parties, 
depending on the concrete liability provisions in the EU and in the relevant national 
law (Directive 2019/1024, para 44). Thus, each Member State has its own licensing 
rules, which can vary in terms of their strictness. Dulong de Rosnay and Janssen (2014), 
for example, observe that in some countries, such as the UK, the rules may prevent 
third-parties from misusing the provided open data, while other countries, such as 
279Cancan Wang and Kalina Staykova
France, may take stricter approach by explicitly prohibiting any modification of the 
publicly available dataset.
Recently, we have observed that local regulators in China, such as the Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government, have adopted a novel approach towards encouraging 
public bodies to disclose more purposeful data by providing clear guidance in order 
to reduce the legal uncertainty around the situations in which they will be held liable. 
This is particularly interesting, as China’s institutional and policy innovations are 
characterised by experimental governance, in which local officials are encouraged to 
experiment with new ways of problem-solving and their experiences are fed into the 
national problem solving (Heilmann 2008). Understanding the emergence of the 
interim measures in Shanghai, hence can shed light on an alternative law-making 
process for evolving technological phenomena, like open public data.   
Method 
Governance concepts, such as accountability and liability, manifest largely in 
institutionalized documents such as existing laws, regulations, rules and official 
statements (Bovens 2007), but also non-institutionalized interpretations among the 
regulators and legislators (Schillemans, Twist and Vanhommerig 2013). In the case of 
the local regulations on open public data in China, there have been recent experiments 
on the regulation of open public data at the municipal level, such as the Interim 
Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai, which was passed on August 16, 
2019, by the standing committee of Shanghai Municipal People’s Government. The 
interim measures, which took effect on October 1, 2019, are the first local government 
regulations on open public data in China (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government 
2019b). Prior to the interim measures, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government 
has also engaged in consecutive years of active collaboration with private organizations 
and universities to explore the opening and utilization of public data, i.e., Shanghai 
Open Data Apps 2015-2020 (Shanghai Open Data Apps, 2019), which also yielded 
evaluation reports assessing the overall development of open public data in different 
areas of public authorities (Fudan DMG Lab 2017a; 2017b; 2018a; 2018b; 2019), 
and open forum with different stakeholders exchanging opinions and interests on open 
public data (Fudan DMG Lab 2019). 
We have thus drawn on two primary data sources for this study: First, the Interim 
Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai; and, Second, available online 
resources such as official statements, reports of the open forums and interviews with the 
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main legislators of the interim measures. The interim measures and official statements 
that were collected through the official website of the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government (http://www.shanghai.gov.cn), only exist in the Chinese version. The 
quotes have been translated into English by one of the authors. The reports of the 
open forums and the interviews with the main legislators of the interim measures 
are drawn from major Chinese media including Xinhuanet (http://www.xinhuanet.
com/), Jiefang Daily (https://www.jfdaily.com/), China.org.cn (http://www.china.org.
cn), Sohu (http://www.sohu.com), and official website of the forum “Yan Do Xian (
腌do鲜 高汤讲坛)” (http://www.dmg.fudan.edu.cn/?p=7065). We paid particular 
attention to the reports, speeches and interviews of key stakeholders from Shanghai 
Municipal Commission of Economy and Informatization (SMCEI), Shanghai Big 
Data Center (SBDC), and Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice (SMBJ) as these 
local authorities played distinctive and important roles in coordinating, promoting, 
utilizing and regulating open public data. More specifically, SMCEI is among the 
first local authorities in Shanghai that has been promoting and coordinating opening 
public data since 2012. SMCEI is responsible for directing, coordinating and making 
overall arrangements on promoting the opening and utilization of public data and 
the development of relevant industries in the Municipality. SBDC is responsible for 
building, operating and maintaining the Shanghai Open Public Data platform, as well 
as for setting up relevant technical standards. SMBJ is part of the working groups that 
drafted the interim measures. In addition, we have also drawn upon the reports that 
detail the development of open data movement in Shanghai to set the stage for the 
emergence of the interim measures (Gao 2018; Wang et al. 2018).
Given the exploratory nature of this study, the interim measures, official statements, 
reports, and interviews with the key stakeholders of the interim measures are analysed 
through qualitative coding using a hermeneutic approach (Bos & Tarnai 1999). Our 
coding entailed a two-step process in which the empirical material was first discussed 
and coded by both authors using an inductive coding scheme. This part of the analysis 
was conducted with an emphasis on how notions of liability were articulated in the 
different materials. We then used the existing definitions of concepts on accountability, 
liability and governance (Bovens 2007; Lourenco et al. 2007) as sensitizing devices 
(Bowen 2006) to make sense of the first-order codes. 
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The Shanghai Case and The Interim Measures for the Opening of 
Public Data in Shanghai  
To answer our research question: how interim regulatory measures can reduce the perceived 
risk of liability among public bodies and contribute to public accountability in open public 
data initiatives, in this section, we start by presenting the development of open public 
data movement in Shanghai in the past decade and the challenges in pursuing local 
authorities to open their data, which paved the way for the making of the Interim 
Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai. We then look into the interim 
measures and regulators’ interpretations of the measures to illustrate the way in which 
the municipal legislative bodies address the local authorities’ unwillingness through the 
liability-related articles in the interim measures.
Open Public Data in Shanghai: Development 
In the past decade, China has seen exponential growth in the availability of public 
data and the amount of open public data programmes across the country, including 
dedicated initiatives and policies (Open Data Barometer 2015; 2018; Fudan DMG Lab 
2017a; 2017b; 2018a; 2018b; 2019a). For example, since the launch of the Shanghai 
Government Data Portal in 2012 as the first open public data platform in China, 
there were 81 new open public data platforms launched by a range of provincial, sub-
provincial, and prefectural level governments by March 2019 (Fudan DMG Lab 2019). 
The development of China’s open data movement is strongly linked to the development 
of big data and is primarily driven by the need to increase government effectiveness and 
efficiency (Barometer 2015), as well as innovation and entrepreneurship (Gao 2018).
While open public data is gradually being institutionalised as a sustainable practice 
across governments in China today, it was anything but mainstream when Shanghai 
embarked on the movement. In 2011, Shanghai pioneered in broadening data access in 
China, but had very little effects: the accessible data did not meet the demands of the 
programmers, and very little valuable data was released. In 2012, a research project was 
funded by the Shanghai Municipal Committee to explore ways to organize around open 
public data by studying cities that have already started to open their data to the public, 
such as New York, London and Singapore (China.org.cn 2019; Jiefang Daily 2019; 
XinhuaNet 2019). While these experiences may have provided inspiration for how to 
create value with public data, Shanghai’s challenge at the time was primarily about how 
to increase data accessibility (Gao 2018). 
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To tackle this challenge, Zhang Baijun, the Vice President of China Industrial 
Design Institute, who is a former civil servant that worked primarily with publishing 
information and data in Shanghai, gathered a group of researchers, entrepreneurs and 
open data advocates to organize a contest to help Shanghai Municipality to publish its 
public data, and in a way that makes sense to the market. The committee introduced 
the concept of “data crowdsourcing” to have different parties contribute to a virtual data 
pool, in the hope that the public can generate valuable ideas, and that, in turn, these 
ideas can push the local authorities to publish more data. In 2015, Shanghai launched 
the open public data-based application contest - Shanghai Open Data Apps (SODA) 
with 10 datasets from the local governments, public institutions and private companies. 
The results took the organizers and the data providing organizations by surprise: not 
only the contest had drawn 823 teams and more than 500 proposals across the country, 
many of the proposals were in fact applicable new business models, policy guidance 
and solutions to the problems of the data providing organizations. The results have, 
for the first time, showed the value of open public data and in this way drove the local 
governments and public institutions to make their data available (Gao 2018).  
Today, with a distinct focus area of public data each year, SODA has continued as 
an annual contest, drawing more than 1500 teams, 6700 citizens to participate in 
the contest and generating 1470 innovative services based on open public data in 
Shanghai (Shanghai Open Data Apps 2019). As recognized by the Shanghai People’s 
Municipal Government, open public data is becoming an organic part of the local open 
environment, and an important driving force for promoting the development of the 
digital economy and protecting people’s well-being in Shanghai. Open public data is 
also seen as an inherent requirement to enhance the local government’s management 
philosophy, and to modernize its governance capabilities (Shanghai People’s Municipal 
Government 2019). Driven by this view, in recent years, the Shanghai People’s 
Municipal Government has carried out a series of work in classifying and opening 
public data, strengthening data security management and control, and promoting the 
cooperation of multiple data subjects. At the moment, Shanghai has ranked first in data 
openness among the local governments in China for three consecutive years since 2017, 
according to the China Open Data Index published by the Lab for Digital and Mobile 
Governance (DMG Lab) of Fudan University (Fudan DMG Lab 2019). 
These local experiments and initiatives in the opening and utilization of public data 
in Shanghai have also paved the way for national push around open public data. As a 
result, in January 2018, Shanghai alongside four other provinces/municipalities, i.e., 
Beijing, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guizhou, has been appointed as a pilot municipality to 
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open its local public information resources, that is, to make available the local public 
data (Shanghai Municipal Economic and Informatization Commission 2019; Xinhua 
Daily Telegraph 2018). 
Open Public Data in Shanghai: Challenges and Motivations for 
Legislation
During the development of the open public data movement in Shanghai, there were 
also issues and challenges revealed in the extent and the way in which public data was 
open among the authorities in the Shanghai Municipality. For example, according to 
the Shanghai People’s Municipal Government’s reports, the governance mechanism of 
opening public data was still yet to be streamlined, there lacked access mechanism of 
public data; and the quality of data in some areas needed to be improved (Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government 2019b). More specifically, key stakeholders from public 
data opening and management bodies, such as SBDC and SMCEI, have mentioned in 
multiple public outlets, different challenges that they have experienced in coordinating 
open public data in Shanghai, which centered around the unwillingness of the local 
authorities to open high-quality public data (Fudan DMG Lab 2019; Southern 
Metropolis Daily 2019). 
Wang Xiaomei, division director at the Shanghai Big Data Center, for instance, 
emphasized in an open forum on open public data that there are two major challenges 
in the opening of public data in Shanghai: the first relates to the overall data quality, 
and the second relates to local authorities’ concerns about the risks of third-parties 
utilization of the open public data (Fudan DMG Lab 2019). According to Wang, the 
value of some public data that has been opened so far was low due to poor data quality. 
She further contended that the challenge with data quality should be tackled through 
fostering accountability, that is a sense of shared social responsibilities, between all 
government departments that collect, integrate and open data. Wang saw the local 
authorities’ fear towards opening public data as one of the reasons why the quality of 
some open public data was low. But rather than enforcing shared social responsibilities, 
Wang contended that the challenge of local authorities’ fear towards opening public 
data should be tackled through more formal institutional mechanisms, especially 
through legislation. 
In the same open public data forum, Qiu Wei, division director at the SMCEI, argued, 
more specifically based on her experience in coordinating opening public data since 
2012, why legislation, such as the interim measures, was viewed as an important 
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way to tackle the challenges in promoting open public data among local authorities 
(Fudan DMG Lab, 2019). Firstly, Qiu argued that since 2012 SMCEI mainly relied 
on administrative measures to impose rules and policies on local authorities to open 
public data. These administrative measures required the support of a legal basis in order 
to push for the next step in opening public data of higher quality, standardization 
and efficiency. Secondly, Qiu argued that the interim measures are also introduced to 
consolidate the municipality’s accumulated experiences on open public data since 2012, 
for example, using the interim measures to institutionalize the best practices of data 
rating and categorization. 
Last but not the least, legislation was seen as a way to fulfil the need for formally 
implementing accountability, including specifying the role of data opening entities 
and their responsibilities. According to Qiu, before the legislation took place, it was 
common that local authorities and departments perceived open data as a service 
rather than a duty (Fudan DMG Lab 2019). Some local authorities and departments 
were not even aware that they were in fact data opening entities. Some departments 
were reluctant to open their data, partly because they had little to no understanding 
of the value of the data, and partly because they were also afraid of the far-reaching 
effects and consequences of data quality issues. In addition, Qiu also saw data quality 
as a manifestation of the level of the administrative capacity of the local authorities 
and departments. By formally institutionalizing the roles and responsibilities of data 
opening entities, legislation is seen as a way to improve the data governance capacity in 
the Shanghai Municipality.
Along this line, reading from the Shanghai People’s Municipal Government reports and 
the key stakeholders’ accounts of open public data in Shanghai, it appears that there are 
in general two inter-related challenges with open public data in Shanghai - one has to 
do with the low data quality in the currently opened public data, and the other has to 
do with the lack of willingness among local authorities and departments in open public 
data due to the public bodies’ fear of the third-party risks in data utilisation, as well 
as the lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities. In tackling these two challenges, 
it seems that the Shanghai People’s Municipal Government had primarily invested in 
establishing a shared sense of accountability to foster the understanding of the roles and 
responsibilities among the local authorities and departments in open public data, as well 
as using administrative measures to enforce the actions needed to be done. Nonetheless, 
as the development of open public data furthers, the Shanghai People’s Municipal 
Government is motivated to formally institutionalize the roles and responsibilities 
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through legislation to further promote the local authorities and departments’ capacity of 
data governance. 
Interestingly, the legislation was not only motivated by the coordination needs of 
the municipality, but also by the private stakeholders’ interests in data utilization. 
In October 2018, the extent of openness of public data in Shanghai was highlighted 
in the consultation conference between the mayor Ying Yong and the international 
entrepreneurs in Shanghai. At the conference, the CEOs/presidents of a number of 
multinational corporations suggested the Shanghai People’s Municipal Government 
should further improve the access of public data to stimulate industrial development 
in Shanghai. The vested interests from the private stakeholders in utilizing data 
for industrial growth also pushed the legislation to put emphasis on liability issues 
that stemmed from the utilization of open public data. Soon after the consultation 
conference in October 2018, Shanghai Mayor Ying Yong gave clear instructions to 
carry out the legislation on the openness of public data (Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government, 2019). 
The Interim Measures: Main Content and Liability Clauses 
Motivated by the institutional need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of local 
authorities and departments in open public data in Shanghai, as well as the private 
stakeholders’ interests in utilizing open public data for driving industrial growth in the 
area, the Shanghai People’s Municipal Government has decided to legislate different 
areas that are associated with open public data.
On August 16th, 2019, the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal 
People’s Government passed the Interim Measures for the Opening of Public Data in 
Shanghai. The interim measures, which took effect on October 1, 2019, are the first 
local government rules (地方政府规章) on open public data in China. Here, local 
government rules generally refer to administrative regulations issued by the local 
government within the scope of their administrative powers and their contents are 
specific to a certain matter (Shenyang Municipal People’s Congress 2017), in this case, 
the opening of public data in Shanghai. The local government rules mainly concern the 
functions and responsibilities of administrative subjects, and the rights and obligations 
of administrative counterparts. It is important to note that local government rules and 
local regulations (地方性法规) are both treated as law with binding force according to 
the Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2015 Amendment). While the 
local regulations are issued by the local people’s congress and its standing committee, 
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the local government rules are issued by local governments. According to the legislation 
law, when there are existing national laws and local regulations of a specific matter, 
the national laws and local regulations prevail over local government rules at the same 
level (Zou, 2006). If not, local government rules can be issued first in response to the 
administrative needs of the local government (Shenyang Municipal People’s Congress 
2017) and used as experiments that precede local regulations and national laws (The 
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China 2020). In the latter case, 
according to Article 82 in the Legislation Law, two years after the local government 
rules are issued, local governments can propose to the local people’s congress or its 
standing committee to make local regulations when the local governments need to 
continue to implement administrative measures. 
The interim measures consist of 8 chapters, 48 articles, which include general 
provisions, opening mechanism, platform construction, data utilization, diversified 
data opening, supervision and protection, liability, and supplementary rules. The 
interim measures primarily cover 6 areas of open public data, including clarifying the 
management mechanism for opening public data; establishing a long-term mechanism 
for opening public data; optimising the construction of open public platform; ensuring 
the legitimacy of public data utilization; creating a diversified system for opening 
public data, and strengthening the supervision and protection of opening public 
data (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government 2019b). The interim measures have 
categorized four different types of entities, including data opening entities (数据开放主
体), data utilization entities (数据利用主体), platform management entities (平台管
理主体), and security management entities (安全管理主体). In Chapter 7, the interim 
measures specify the corresponding liabilities of the four entities, that are the range of 
behaviours the different entities are legally responsible for, which we present below. 
Starting with the data opening entities, which are all departments of the Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government, district people’s governments and other public 
administration and service institutions, these entities are held liable if they:
 – fail to open and update the public data of the unit in accordance with regulations
 – fail to desensitize and declassify open data in accordance with regulations
 – do not meet the unified standards; establish new independent open channels; or 
fail to incorporate existing open channels into the municipal open platform in 
accordance with regulations
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 – fail to handle the objections or notifications from natural person, legal person, or 
unincorporated organizations in accordance with regulations
 – have other behaviours that do not fulfil the data opening duties in accordance with 
regulations
In these cases, the people’s government at the same level and the competent department 
shall command a correction to the data opening entities. If the circumstances are 
serious, the person in charge directly responsible and other persons directly responsible 
shall be punished according to law.
Second, the data utilization entities are held liable if the entities:
 – fail to fulfil its obligations listed in the data utilization agreement
 – violate other people’s legal rights, including trade secrets and individual privacy
 – utilize public data to obtain illegal gains
 – fail to take security measures in accordance with regulations, causing incidents that 
endanger information security
 – have other behaviours that violate the provisions of the interim measures
Third, the platform management entity (i.e., the Municipal Big Data Center) is held 
liable if the entity:
 – fails to document the entire opening and utilization process of the public data in the 
open platform in accordance with regulations
 – fails to deal with the objections or notifications of natural person, legal person and 
unincorporated organizations in accordance with regulations
 – fails to perform other platform management duties in accordance with regulations
In these cases, the competent authority shall command a correction. If the 
circumstances are serious, the person in charge directly responsible and other persons 
directly responsible shall be punished by the competent authority.
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Fourth, the interim measures also specify four types of security management entities, 
including the Municipal Cyber Security and Public Security Department, Municipal 
Big Data Center, Data Opening Entities and other departments with network security 
management functions and their staff. According to the interim measures, if the security 
management entities fail to perform security management duties in accordance with 
regulations, the people’s government at the same level or the competent department at 
the higher level shall order correction. And if the circumstances are serious, the person-
in-charge as well as other directly responsible persons shall be punished according to 
law.
In addition, as we have mentioned above, the interim measures also specified an 
exemption clause for the data opening entities. According to the interim measures, in 
cases where the data opening entities opened their public data and performed the duties 
of supervision, management, and reasonable care according to laws, regulations and 
rules, the data opening entities are not held liable or exempted from the corresponding 
liabilities for the loss of data utilization entities or other third parties caused by issues 
such as data quality. 
In an interview with a major Chinese media outlet, Southern Metropolis Daily, Qiu, 
division director at the SMCEI, revealed one of the primary motivations to introduce 
the interim measures was to improve the coordination of the local authorities and 
departments in opening public data by specifying the four types of entities, their duties 
and the legal consequences in case the entities failed to fulfil their duties (Southern 
Metropolis Daily, 2019). In addition, the exemption clause, according to Qiu, was 
introduced to further improve the willingness of the local authorities and government 
departments to open their data by providing legal waiver for the local authorities and 
government departments in cases of data quality issues causing economic loss of the 
data utilization entities. As Qiu explained in the interview with Southern Metropolis 
Daily:
Private enterprises utilize the public data to make data service products 
or business plan layout, which may actually cause economic loss. In the 
interim measures, we don’t encourage enterprises to hold government 
departments accountable because the enterprises believe the failure 
of their product is caused by the data provided by governments. 
The exemption clause is thus introduced to unload the burden of 
government departments to the maximum extent through legislation.
289Cancan Wang and Kalina Staykova
In addition, Qiu also emphasized that the liability measures, which are the specified 
legal consequences, are not the only driver for local authorities and government 
departments to open public data of better quality. Informal institutional pressures, such 
as organizational reputation, is also an important driver for the local authorities and 
government departments to improve their data quality, as Qiu explained:
From a government’s perspective, once their data is open to the public, 
the data can only be of better quality. That is to say, it is not possible 
that the government departments open data of problematic quality to 
the public. Even if the government departments can get exempted from 
their liabilities, the consequences of opening problematic data can still 
cause damage to their organizational reputation, which will not be good 
for to these government departments.  
Along this line, the liability measures in the Interim Measures for the Opening of Public 
Data in Shanghai appear to emerge from the need to solve the coordination challenges 
in opening public data in the Shanghai Municipality - more specifically, on the local 
authorities and government departments’ willingness to open public data of high 
quality. While formal institutional acts such as liability clauses offer guidelines on who 
should be held accountable for what, information institutional pressures also push 
public bodies to open high-quality datasets in order to preserve their organizational 
reputation.
Discussion 
The overview of the development of open public data initiatives in Shanghai helps us 
identify the lack of willingness of the local authorities and government departments 
to open public data as a key barrier that emerged in the coordination among the 
data opening entities as well as the demands of data utilization entities. Seeing the 
unwillingness of the local authorities and government departments as a reflection of 
unclear recognition of roles and duties, lack of understanding of the value of open 
public data, as well as limited administrative capacity, the Shanghai Municipal People’s 
Government used legislation, i.e., the Interim Measures for the Opening of Public 
Data in Shanghai, as a way to reduce legal uncertainties around liability and formally 
institutionalize the roles and duties of different stakeholders of open public data in the 
municipality. In the meantime, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government also helps 
the data opening entities to cope with uncertain consequences of data utilization by 
introducing the exemption clause. 
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Our findings make four contributions to the existing governance studies on open public 
data. First, we present a Chinese case on open public data that is new and emergent 
and has not been explored among the governance research community. Currently, there 
have been scattered studies focusing on achieving accountability of open public data 
and investigating the legal and non-legal consequences associated with it (Cerrillo-i-
Martınez 2012; Lourenço et al. 2017; Peixoto 2013; Reggi and Dawes 2016). In terms 
of legal consequences, these studies primarily focus on liability measures on national 
level (e.g., UK, USA, and so on) and supra-national level (the EU). To the best of 
our knowledge, this paper is among the first studies that explore the local legislative 
measures on open public data (i.e., at municipal level) and in a Chinese context. Our 
findings show that the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government chose to issue Interim 
Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai as local government rules that are 
issued by the local governments, instead of local regulations that are issued by the local 
people’s congress and its standing committee. This choice can have some interesting 
implications, when it comes to the implementation of the interim measures. As we 
have mentioned before, there are some differences between the local government rules 
and the local regulations, but the distinction is not as clear, especially when there is 
no existing national law or regulation of a specific matter. Nevertheless, in practice, 
existing study shows there is a common perception among the local governments in 
China that local regulations have a higher legal status than local government rules, 
which may compromise the authority and effectiveness of local government rules 
(Liu, 2015). In this sense, future studies should follow up on the implementation of 
the Interim Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai and investigate what 
are the perceptions of the interim measures among the local authorities, especially 
considering their different positions, pressures and perceptions of risks, and if there is 
any interplay between the perceived legal status of the interim measures and the effects 
of implementation. Based on studies as such, one can look further into whether the local 
government rules are suitable legal instruments for regulating open public data in the 
long run in the Chinese context.
Moreover, as we have mentioned above, China’s institutional and policy innovations 
during the economic reform are observed to be characterised by experimental 
governance, in which the central policymaking relies on the experiences of local 
experimentation to address uncertainty (Heilmann 2008a; 2008b; 2009). While 
our findings on the making of the Interim Measures for the Opening of Public Data in 
Shanghai confirm a similar pattern of law-making in an evolving technological area like 
open public data, there are also nuances. This is mainly considering the open public 
data movement and the SODA contest that preceded the making of the regulation was 
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not developed under the top-down mandate of the central government. Rather, it was 
only after the Shanghai Municipality became successful in organizing the contest and 
exploring open public data that, in 2018, the central government appointed the four 
cities, including Shanghai, as pilot areas. Future studies should look into whether such 
hybrid patterns between a bottom-up experiment and a top-down recognition would 
be an emerging experiment governance mode in China to address uncertainties in 
technological innovation, such as artificial intelligence or blockchain.
Second, from the case analysis, we have identified that reducing legal uncertainty 
around different stakeholders’ liabilities constitutes a new way to increase the 
accountability of the stakeholders, participating in open public data initiatives. As we 
have mentioned previously, several governance researchers have argued that open public 
data can bring benefits such as increased government accountability (Lourenço et al. 
2017; Peixoto 2013; Reggi and Dawes 2016). Nonetheless, other scholars have also 
pointed out that the availability of open data to the public does not necessarily lead 
to the achievement of all intended benefits (Peixoto 2013; Reggi and Dawes 2016). 
Rather, accountability is achieved through a process involving several steps, such as 
disclosure of data, followed by discussion around the open data and the realization 
of certain consequences (Bovens 2007; Lourenço et al. 2017; Schillemans, Van 
Twist and Vanhommerig 2013). Our finding shows that the Shanghai Municipality 
sees governments’ accountability in open public data initiative as a process that is 
achieved through multiple types of entities (i.e., data opening entities, data utilization 
entities, platform management entities, and security management entities) with a 
specific range of duties. Through legislation under the form of interim measures, the 
Shanghai Municipal People’s Government manages to reduce legal uncertainty around 
the liabilities, which these four different types of entities can incur, and in this way 
removing one of the barriers preventing public bodies to participate fully in open 
government initiative, consequently leading to increased accountability. 
The interviews with the legislators also reveal organizational reputation as an important 
driver for local governments to open high quality data. Apart from legal consequences 
(i.e., liability), open data initiatives can also lead to non-legal consequences such as 
negative public image (Lourenço et al. 2017). In particular, the increased visibility of 
actions by public bodies can reveal poor decision-making and judgement (Lourenço 
et al. 2017). In addition, as our case reveals, the opening of public data in Shanghai is 
a process that starts from local authorities and then expands to the other authorities. 
During this process, the data opening level of local authorities that have already made 
available their high-quality data and benefited from the citizen participation may 
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become an informal institutional pressure (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) for the other 
authorities to conform due to changes of expectations on the norms of public service 
provision among both the citizens and the local authorities. Future studies should 
extend the focus on liability measures as formal institutional measures to achieve 
accountability and investigate the informal institutional measures that motivate public 
bodies to act in order to achieve better accountability. 
Third, we argue that the interim nature of the measures is critical for experimenting 
with legislation around emergent and uncertain technological phenomena, such as open 
public data, which leaves space for changes in case the phenomena evolve. Existing 
studies have looked into regulatory instruments such as Directives (on EU level), and 
national laws (e.g., Dulong de Rosnay and Janssen 2014) to guide implementation 
of open data initiatives, with limited degree of success. The introduction of such 
hard law legal instruments prematurely, however, can lead to negative repercussions 
such as curbing innovation efforts (Mandel 2017). In addition, in the context of 
uncertainty brought by new technologies, legal scholars have also advocated for the use 
of certain principles, which are mainly technology-neutral, and which outline broad 
recommendations on how to address the emerging uncertainty (Mosses 2017). While 
these principles have their own merits, due to their broad scope and relative vagueness 
(also in relation to incurred liability), they may lead to local authorities complying 
with them in a minimal manner or altogether circumventing them. In response to this 
concern, one of the implied findings of the Shanghai case is the interim nature of the 
regulatory instrument that the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government uses, which, 
while providing concrete recommendations, also leaves room for adjustment. Thus, we 
rather argue that it may be more beneficial for regulators to reduce uncertainty around 
liability by adopting rather specific measures, which are at the same time temporary, 
hence flexible. While the current interim measures are being tested and implemented 
into formal measures in Shanghai, future research should embark on investigating the 
relation between the adopted regulatory instrument and its impact on successfully 
addressing the uncertainty of technological development. 
In addition, our study sheds further light on the appropriate level to regulate open 
data initiatives in order to ensure that such initiatives can achieve the desired benefits. 
Scholars have already investigated whether supra-national level, national or local 
authorities should regulate given open public data initiative in order to make it 
successful (see, e.g., Dulong de Rosnay and Janssen 2014; Schillemans, Van Twist and 
Vanhommerig 2013). Our study contributes further to this debate by drawing attention 
to the importance of local measures to guide specific open public data initiatives. As 
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the local measures can be targeted towards specific characteristics of a given open 
public data initiative and can be drafted and passed through a relatively simplified legal 
process, we argue that, for some initiatives, regulating on local level, rather than national 
level, may be more beneficial for ensuring broader, high-quality participation. We 
further argue that, faced with the need to reduce legal uncertainty around liability issues 
in connection to open public data, legislators may benefit not only from regulating at a 
local level, but also by adopting interim measures, thus allowing for more flexibility in 
case the adopted measures are not suitable for achieving the desired benefits. We urge 
researchers to investigate in detail examples of regulatory measures around open public 
data initiatives at a local level in order to map the different approaches and estimate 
their effectiveness. Scholars can also study the perception of different local authorities 
towards the introduced interim measures and further analyze their willingness to 
comply with them and their degree of compliance. As the different local authorities 
differ in terms of their goals, structures, risk attitude, and so on, we could expect some 
variations in their perceptions and responses to the interim measures. In addition, 
we call for researchers to further compare and contrast regulatory measures on supra-
national, national and local levels in order to point out under what circumstances, 
authorities at each level should regulate and to what degree.
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have explored the link between public accountability as a desired 
outcome of open public data initiatives and the perceived risk of liability by public 
bodies by looking into the contexts of emergence as well as the contents of the recently 
announced Interim Measures for the Opening of Public Data in Shanghai. We particularly 
focused on the clauses around liability and the motivations for introducing them. 
Our findings show that the interim measures are a formal way to institutionalize 
the roles and duties of different stakeholders of open public data in the Shanghai 
municipality. Meanwhile, they also protect the data opening entities to cope with 
uncertain consequences of data utilization by introducing the exemption clause. In this 
way, we argue that the interim measures, outlining duties for specific entities in data 
opening while remaining flexible in accounting for the consequences of data utilization, 
constitute a novel regulatory approach towards reducing the legal uncertainty around 
perceived risks of liability in the area of open public data. This approach can potentially 
influence public bodies to participate in a meaningful way in open public data 
initiatives. 
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This paper makes four contributions to the understanding of open public data 
legislation: first, we present a Chinese case on open public data that is new and 
emergent and has not been explored among the governance research community. The 
case raises interesting discussions on the implications of implementing local government 
rules, as well as on the mode of experimental governance to address evolving 
technological phenomena in a Chinese context. Second, from the case analysis, we have 
identified reducing legal uncertainty around different stakeholders’ liabilities as a way 
to improve data opening entities’ willingness to open public data, hence potentially 
increasing the accountability of these public bodies. Third, we have also emphasized the 
interim nature of the measures as key to experiment legislation around emergent and 
uncertain technological phenomena, such as open public data, which leaves space for 
changes in case of technological development. Last, we have drawn further attention 
to the importance for authorities to regulate at a local level, as opposed to national and 
supra-national levels, in order to ensure more efficient realization of the benefits related 
to open public data initiatives. 
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